Never Innocent:
Feminist Trouble with Sex Offender
Registries and Protection in a Prison Nation

Abstract
Using recent work by anti-prison theorists and community-based activists who are working against the prison industrial complex, this article links prison abolition to feminist frameworks to question escalating sex offender registries and community notification laws that are the state's response to sexual violence against children and women. Part one offers a brief and queer history of sex offender registries in the United States and their growth in the last two decades, the available data on who assaults children and women. Part one will also use existing research to question the goal of safety that these registries advance. Part two builds on this foundation to use current shifts in the juvenile justice system to investigate how race, class, and gender complicate who has access to the protected categories of childhood and motherhood, and to the characteristic of innocence. Part three examines how sex offender registries participate in the larger practices of the privatization of public space and the expanding prison industrial complex. Part four concludes by using abolition as a possible framework to shift public dialogues about safety and conceptions about childhood and family, and discusses organizations that work within this framework to challenge our nation's over-reliance on incarceration.

Sex offender registries (SORs) and accompanying community notification laws are the newest facet of our expanding prison nation in the United States (Simon 2000; Levine 2002; Davey and Goodnough 2007; Long 2008). Scaffolded by hyperbolic media coverage of child abductions and sexual

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assaults by strangers, restrictions for convicted child sex offenders continue to escalate. Civil commitment laws, enacted in over a dozen states by 2008 and upheld by the Supreme Court in a 2005 decision, aim to geographically detain and segregate certain categories of sex offenders, indefinitely, after release (Feuer 2005; Davey and Goodnough 2007). In several states, laws have been passed to require surgical or chemical castration for repeat offenders after they have served their sentences so they can avoid civil commitment or achieve a conditional release (Rondeaux 2006). Restrictions on public space intensify: as of 2008, registered child sex offenders in Illinois were prohibited from living within “500 feet of a school, playground, or any facility providing programs or services exclusively directed toward people under age 18” (Illinois State Police 2006, 11). In Iowa, convicted sex offenders cannot reside within 2,000 feet of schools or places where children congregate, thus effectively prohibiting anyone on the SOR from living in an urban center (Davey 2006). While sexual violence against children (and women) is by any measure a global epidemic, “stranger danger,” as this article documents, is the least significant risk (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000).

Sex offender registries and associated punitive laws are part of our national “tough on crime” agenda that entraps increasing numbers of our brothers and sisters in an expanding prison industrial complex (PIC). The PIC refers to the 2,319,258 adults held in U.S. prisons or jails (one prisoner for every 99.1 men and women) (Pew Center on the States 2008). This number jumps to almost eight million if we count those on probation or parole, or those housed in immigration detention centers, or in prisons outside U.S. boundaries (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2006; Rodríguez 2008). The PIC also refers to the privatization and the profit to be made from detention centers and technologies, the expanding power of corrections officers’ unions, and the false perception of prisons as a “growth economy,” particularly in the rural, deindustrialized U.S. (Davis 2003; Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2003; Gilmore 2007). This expanding incarceration nation is a direct result of a national, punitive, law-and-order agenda and of public policies that target women, poor people, and/or people of color—for example, before the war on drugs, mandatory minimum sentencing—not from a rise in violent crime (Mauer 1999; Davis 2000; Simon 2007).

Disproportionately warehousing communities of color and poor people—1 in 9 African American males between age 20 and 34, and 1 in
100 African American women, are behind bars— the reaches of the PIC extend beyond prison walls. The “collateral consequences” of conviction confer a social or civil death on increasing numbers of our brothers and sisters (Patterson 1982; Mauer and Chesney-Lind 2003; Gilmore 2004). Those with criminal records are restricted, in some states, from voting, accessing social services including public housing, employment (formally through prohibitions or informally when employers simply refuse to hire those with records), and, in some states, parenting. In 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court found Detra Welch to be an unfit parent, terminating her parental rights based only on her history of incarceration (Marlan 2005). The impact of incarceration can also mean physical death, because of hazardous and inadequate conditions in U.S. prisons and jails, including overcrowding in unhealthy facilities and substandard health (including dental) and mental health care (Cooper 2002; von Zielbauer 2005). The ongoing consequences of incarceration generate a revolving door on the cellblocks for those caught up in the prison industrial complex, including convicted sex offenders.

Across disciplines, scholars have examined the SOR, conceptions of sex offenders, and the state’s response to violence against women. For example, research has explored the “moral panic” surrounding the SO (Jenkins 1998; Levine 2002; Cassell and Cramer 2008), and literary theorists have explored the specter of the child molester (Rose 1992; Kincaid 1998). Scholars interested in the problematically mobile categories of “sexual normalcy” have written about sex offenders and the consequences of some SOR laws on non-heteronormative bodies (Jacobson 1999; Rofes 2005). Anti-violence activists, educators, and scholars link violence against women directly to violence perpetrated by the state, and challenge the subsequently impoverished responses of the state to further criminalize the poor and/or communities of color (Richie 1996; Silliman and Bhattacharjee 2002). Feminist legal theory has explored multiple facets of the state’s attempts to criminalize sexual violence against women (Corrigan 2006; Ehrlich 2007).

A growing body of scholarship also critically engages with our nation’s over-reliance on incarceration. For example, feminist, anti-racist scholarship points to the disproportionate impact of the PIC on women, in particular women of color and/or poor women (Faith 2005; Sudbury 2005). Scholarship links our nation’s “tough on crime” policies to histories of white supremacy and explicitly challenges the persistent myth that
increased punishment acts as a deterrent and that the “tough on crime” policies are responsible for any decline in violent crimes (Mauer 1999; Davis 2000; Wacquant 2002; Davis 2003 and 2005; Simon 2007). Scholar-activists have also named the prison construction boom of the 1980s as anti-development, or as public policies that do not benefit communities or economies (Gilmore 2007). Moreover, resistance to our punishing democracy’s reliance on surveillance, policing, and incarceration is not centered just in universities and academic journals. There is a persistent anti-prison movement in the United States, evidenced by the over 3,000 people who participated in the September 2008 Critical Resistance conference in Oakland CA, and multiple local networks—composed of faith-based associations, educators, and youth organizations—recognize the detrimental impact of channeling public resources to incarceration rather than to education (Meiners 2007; CR 10 Publications Collective 2008).

Yet, despite this flurry of legislation, media rhetoric, related scholarly work, and movement building, SORs have escalated with relative public silence. My research suggests that no anti-prison movement has developed a campaign to draw attention to escalating SORs as public policy failures or to name how they participate in expanding the PIC. National, visible feminist organizations that work on issues related to violence against women and children have not publicly challenged the expansion of SORs, or, more broadly, directly addressed the way that strategies that turn to the state to protect women and children do not make our communities, or children and women, any safer. Criminalizing men who assault their intimate partners, for example, has led to a rise in the incarceration (and deportation) of poor men of color, not a decline in the number of women who are assaulted (Wittner 1998; Sen 1999; Richie 2000). In addition, despite the criminalization of queers, a population historically defined as sex offenders, national lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) organizations have not documented how current SORs potentially impact those who identify as LGBT or non-heteronormative. LGBT organizations have been silent about the fact that SORs do not reduce violence against queers, and they have not initiated any public campaigns or research about how SORs could potentially augment “fear of the queer” by recirculating public discourses on “sex offenders.”

This silence surrounding SORs testifies to a conceptual and material problem that must be addressed by those committed to building stronger
and safer communities without augmenting our prison nation. The array of "extra" punitive systems created to name and manage sex offenders, and the very concept of sex offender, should be at the forefront of debate and discussion for queer, anti-racist, feminist, anti-prison activists and scholars because the bodies and violence at stake pose compelling material and conceptual challenges. Centering SORs and the production of an SO in the context of the PIC and persistent intimate violence against women and children highlights how the "stranger danger" myth, media attention to the SO, and hyper-punitive SORs distract us from naming and challenging often state-sanctioned violence against women, children, and others who are economically and politically vulnerable. As this article will document, in order to begin to respond to persistent and catastrophic intimate violence against women and children without resorting to an expansion of our prison nation, childhood and family must be examined.

Using work by anti-prison theorists and community-based activists who are working against the prison industrial complex, including my own activism, this article uses a trans-disciplinary approach to question the state's response to sexual violence against children and women and to illustrate that challenging SORs must be a focal point of work for queer, feminist, anti-racist, anti-prison scholars and activists. Part 1 offers a brief and queer history of sex offender registries in the United States and their growth in the last two decades and the available data on who assaults children and women. Part 1 also uses existing research to question the goal of safety that these registries advance as well as how these registries participate in the criminalization and privatization of public space. Part 2 builds on this foundation to illustrate how SORs participate in the remaking of childhood, motherhood, and innocence. At stake, and often rendered invisible in public discussions of SORs, is that while selected mothers and children are seen as political entities worthy of protection, others are not.

Part 3 concludes by grounding this analysis in my local work, and uses prison abolition as a potential framework to shift public dialogues about safety, and to shift conceptions about childhood and family—and introduces anti-racist, feminist organizations that work within this abolition framework to challenge the incarceration nation and to address violence against women and children.

This is tricky work, the stakes are high, and I worry that I might not be up to the task. Through problematizing sex offender registries, troubling
childhood, and questioning constructs of sexual normalcy and deviancy, it is not my intent to minimize persistent, pervasive sexual violence against children and women by challenging the limited efforts of the state to actually care or to do something. Rather, as demonstrated in this article, the state has always valued the lives and the innocence of specific children and women more highly than those of others, and both innocence and sexual normalcy continue to be used to cloak regressive, heteronormative, and punitive state practices. This is an old story in the United States. Miscegenation laws animated the constructed category of whiteness through the criminalization of "interracial" marriage and sexual acts (Lemire 2002). Black men were lynched to preserve the sexual "safety" and the racial purity of white women (Wells-Barnett 2002). Gays, lesbians, and non-gender-conforming queers are still often perceived as sexual deviants who are "unfit to teach" (Blount 2005). The heteronormative innocence of selected white women is enshrined in policies and in the very conception of the nation-state itself (Smith 2005). Because of this ongoing history, I am perennially suspicious of what the state establishes to protect the innocence and the safety of particular children and women. Too often, constructs of the good, the bad, and the innocent are simply mobile artifacts that often shield racial privileges, rationalize gender and sexual oppression, and perpetuate systemic institutional ignorances (Sedgwick 1990; Mills 1997).

Part 1

Sex, Offenders, and the Trouble with Private Spaces

Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's 2003 six to three decision in Lawrence & Garner v. State of Texas ruling anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional, sodomy, or simply the intent to perform it, was still a crime in many states. While penalties varied, a conviction on a sodomy-related charge carried an average maximum prison term of ten years. Across the U.S., criminalization of same-sex sexual practices (or even just the intent to perform these acts) resulted in a number of arrests and felony convictions.

[A] 1966 project by the University of California (Los Angeles) Law Review quantified the number of men arrested and convicted in Los Angeles County through anti-gay entrapment and harassment techniques. It found that sodomy laws were enforced frequently; 493 men were
arrested for consensual sodomy over a three-year period in Los Angeles in the early 1960s, with 257 men convicted of sodomy and 104 imprisoned. . . . These results correspond with those of other major cities, with substantial numbers of arrests for sodomy and many more for misdeemeanor gay-related solicitation offenses. . . . The penalties for convictions of the different offenses varied widely. Consensual sodomy was a felony offense in nearly every state and carried an average maximum prison term of ten years; only murder, kidnapping and rape were penalized more severely. (Jacobson 1999, 3)

Through the start of the twenty-first century in urban centers across the U.S., "registries" tracked those perceived to engage in "sex offenses" and collected information on same-sex sexual activity, generally by men (Jacobson 1999; Eskridge 2008). Registries also carried documentation of other charges levied against men perceived to be gay or to be engaging in same-sex sexual practices and activities, including "lewd conduct," "lewd vagrancy," and "outraging public decency." Registries became less popular by the 1970s largely because they were private documents internal to police forces, and the registries were often broad and too cumbersome to use (Humphreys 1970; Jacobsen 1999; Eskridge 2008).

In the 1980s, as the tracking and harassment of "known homosexuals" waned, sexual offender registries found a new use: registration of child predators. In Illinois, a state that has built a detention facility almost every year for the past twenty-five years and no new public institutions of post-secondary education in the same time period, the 1986 Habitual Child Sex Offender Registration Law established the first public registry in Illinois for those convicted of sexual offenses against children. In the subsequent twenty years, registration requirements in Illinois and across every state have been expanded to include a broader range of offenses, including, essentially, all sex offenses and other crimes against children. SORs also increased the community notification components and the amount of information available to the public (the Illinois State Police Public Sex Offender Information website was up by 1999), and amplified the restrictions attached to registration.

Throughout the 1990s federal laws were passed to require states to develop registries, to increase the community notification components, and to integrate and standardize state processes of tracking and identifying SOs. In 1994, as a part of the Federal Violent Crime Control and Law

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Enforcement Act, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act was passed to require states to create sex offender registries for crimes against children (Wright 2003). In 1996, in direct response to the abduction and murder of twelve-year-old Polly Klaas (1992) and seven-year-old Megan Kanka (1994) by two men with prior convictions for violent sexual crimes, the federal government passed Megan's Law, establishing a national sex offender registry that was accessible to the public, to circulate information about known sex offenders across the nation and to coordinate all the state registry systems that emerged in the 1990s (Wright 2003). In 2006, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act established a national SOR that requires those convicted of a range of offenses, from public indecency and lewdness to aggravated child sexual assault, to be systemically classified across each state (and tribe) according to escalating levels of danger: Tier 1, 2, or 3. The rapid implementation of these laws has been tested and supported in courts, and more draconian measures are appearing. Civil commitment laws, passed in a dozen states by 2006 and upheld by the Supreme Court in a 2005 decision, aim to geographically detain and segregate certain categories of sex offenders, indefinitely, after release (Feuer 2005; Davey and Goodnough 2007; Mansnerus 2007). Nationally, as of 2007, there are approximately 400,000 people on the SO registry (National Alert Registry). In Illinois, as of 2006, there are currently 17,157 people on the SOR: 66% white (includes Hispanic) and 33% black. Only 2% of the SOR is female in Illinois (Illinois State Police 2006).

In some states, SORs are retroactive, requiring anyone convicted of a sex offense, “since 1981” in Massachusetts (Jacobsen 1999), to register. While the reimplementation of SORs in the 1990s was not specifically designed to entrap consensual sodomy or to harass same-sex sexual practices, deviance is a social and legal framework used to control and marginalize women, non-heteronormative practices, and/or communities of color (Best 2004). Deviance has included “interracial” marriage (and sex), illegal until overturned in 1967 by the Loving v. State of Virginia decision. Inversely, “normalcy” protected perpetrators and normalized violence; for example, it was legal to rape your wife until the 1970s (as late as the 1990s in some states). Deviance and normalcy are still used against queers as evidenced in anti-gay marriage amendments and bans in Florida and Ohio and other states against any non-heterosexual adult wanting to adopt children.
(Bernstein 2003; Perry 2007). Even when laws are supposedly neutral or not targeting non-heteronormative sex practices, they are disproportionately used against non-heterosexuals. For example, lewdness and indecent exposure charges are still levied against men who engage in consensual same-sex sexual acts in public spaces and are almost never directed toward public acts of heterosexuality (Eskridge 2008). Homophobia, built into laws or enshrined in practices and applications of these laws, was not miraculously waived with the 2003 Supreme Court decision (Lawrence v. Texas) that ruled sodomy laws unconstitutional.

SORs also restrict employment, housing, and mobility, particularly in public spaces where children congregate. The restrictions are specific. In Iowa, convicted sex offenders cannot reside within 2,000 feet of schools or places where children congregate, thus effectively prohibiting anyone on the SOR from living in an urban center (Davey 2006). In Miami, the SOR distance requirement is 2,500 feet, and many on the registry live under a bridge (Thompson 2007). In 2006, developers in Texas and Kansas marketed new housing developments as “sex offender free,” requiring background checks for all potential purchasers. If someone who lives in the communities is convicted of a sex offense, they will be fined $1,500 a day until they leave. The first wave of development, 150 housing units, in the Lenaxa, Kansas, community is sold out (Koch 2006). While perhaps simply an astute marketing ploy, it is important to note that these practices are being taken up by the private sector. Through these formal and private-sector mobility and public-space restrictions, SORs construct meanings about what kinds of public space are dangerous for children, where children are most at risk or vulnerable, and by default what kinds of spaces are safe or risk-free.

Although there are insufficient data to track how SORs impact recidivism, a longitudinal study from the early 1990s, prior to a national registry system, offers a general portrait of recidivism. While convicted sex offenders are less likely than convicted non-sex offenders to be rearrested for any offense, if sex offenders re-offend they are about “four times more likely than non-sex offenders to be arrested for another sex crime after their discharge from prison” (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003, 1). Of the 9,691 male sex offenders released from prisons in fifteen states in 1994, 5.3 percent were rearrested for a new sex crime within three years of release (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2003, 1). While there is little conclusive data that illustrates that SORs reduce the likelihood of recidivism, research
documents that stranger abduction is the least prevalent. “Sexual Assault of Young Children as Reported to Law Enforcement: Victim, Incident, and Offender Characteristics in 2000” (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000) clearly identifies that for all children under eighteen, strangers are consistently the least likely to be the perpetrators of sexual assaults, generally significantly less than 10 percent. These are reported incidents to law enforcement. As the sanctions against naming a family member are high, the number of family and acquaintance incidences is under-reported.

SORs operate on the premise that communities that are aware of who is a designated sexual predator will act correspondingly to protect/monitor their children. Yet, if there is an enemy, “the enemy is us” (Levine 2002). SORs are organized not to monitor family members or acquaintances, the most likely to assault or to abduct children, or to dismantle patriarchy, but to protect children from dangerous strangers. The circulation of photos and addresses of known sex offenders is perhaps useful to raise awareness of stranger assaults, but it fosters the assumption that strangers pose the most significant threat to the safety of children. Just as mass media are used to scaffold the production of selected youth as dangerous, or prisons as the natural containment sites of those inherently evil, mass media recycles familiar and profitable child-saving storylines by reproducing the fear of stranger danger and the requirement of child protection from external enemies (Best 1990; Rapping 2003). When mass media represents violence against children, it more frequently depicts and sensationalizes stranger assault cases, and the media is much less likely to attempt to be unbiased in their reporting on this topic (Best 1990). Kincaid offers a list of reasons for the explosion of media and public panic in the 1980s in the U.S. surrounding stranger child abuse and child abductions. His list ranges from “it directs our attention away from more pressing ills”, to “it attacks working mothers most viciously . . . and it gives the police and policing agencies godlike power” (Kincaid 1998, 21). Or perhaps, as theorists such as Lauren Berlant suggest, the demonization of selected vulnerable populations who are already “too bruised by history” (Berlant, as cited in Rhodes 2005, 402), such as sex offenders, functions to signify legitimate participation in society. Acceptance can be purchased through the demonization of those of lesser value, and in some spheres child molesters are an easy mark. Shunning these “worst of the worst” can be perceived as a
universal practice of "civilized" communities and people, and can be a mechanism to signify inclusion and acceptance.

Regardless, the consequences of this disproportionate representation are clear. This "terror talk" (Katz 2005, 109) is used in the public sphere to produce anxieties about childhood and the expansion of the fear of the stranger and, through policies and mass media, functions to erase the reality of the much more prevalent threat of violence in the family, a space that is conceptualized as both natural and safe. "More important still, if damage to children can be shown to stem from lone abusers, then the wider culture—with its responsibilities, trials and dangers in relation to children—can be absolved" (Rose 1992, xi). The perpetuation of stranger danger takes responsibility off the construct of the family or patriarchy. If violence to children is represented as the stranger, the nuclear family is preserved as a natural and safe institution. This template of the normal still persists, even as it is clearly not the norm demographically, and, as this discussion works to illustrate, it is often a violent space and institution for children and women. For example, on average, more than three women are murdered by their husbands or boyfriends in the U.S. every day (Tjaden and Thoennes 1998). Generally, this violence occurs in the home, and the fear for women and children is not the stranger, but the men who are known to them.

SORs also participate in the privatization and the criminalization of public space. The prison industrial complex requires enemies and fears to justify the augmentation of the carceral state. Public space is too dangerously unsafe. The sex offender is potentially lurking in every playground and school, the drug seller on every corner, thus necessitating surveillance cameras, metal detectors, background checks, and more. These punitive, protective policies and institutions reconfigure space through fear and through the accompanying racialized surveillance. While perhaps appearing neutral, these technologies of surveillance actively target poor people and communities of color, and participate in the privatization of public spaces, which also disproportionately targets those who do not have access to the private sphere and who must rely on both public space and public institutions.

This surveillance, including SORs, reconfigures public space. The mobility and public-space restrictions attached to SORs construct meanings about what kinds of public space are dangerous for which children, where children are most at risk or vulnerable, and by default, what kinds of
spaces are safe or risk-free. With seventy percent of all reported sexual assaults against children committed in a residence, usually the victim’s, this emphasis on “public spaces,” namely parks and schools, is odd (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000). In particular, schools have emerged as highly policed spaces in contemporary public policies. For example, almost every state has also adopted “drug-free zones” around schools, and as a 2006 Justice Policy Institute Report identified, these zones overwhelmingly “blanket” neighborhoods in urban areas where predominantly people of color reside: “76 percent of Newark, and over half of Camden and Jersey City” (Greene, Pranis, and Ziedenberg 2006, 26). These zones also result in the express targeting of these communities of color by police, and, notably, they fail entirely in their function, to keep drugs away from schools. By highlighting schools, these policies, not unlike the mobility restrictions in sex offender registers, create both false perceptions of what space is safe, or how spaces can be made safer.

Notably, with these rationalizations of fear (of racialized violence and crime, and of sex offenders), the public commons is shrinking. Private spaces are perceived as less dangerous and more controllable, and those with resources continue to create private, secure personal domains. Cultural geographer Setha Low offers some conservative figures about the growth of gated communities in the U.S. In 1998, 4,013,655 households (or 3.4 percent) of the U.S. population lived in communities that require entry codes, key cards, or security-guard approvals. By 2001, sixteen million people lived in gated communities where privileges are based on property rights, not on citizenship, and where access to public services—roads, sanitation, and so on—which may be paid for in part by the state, is restricted. Low also documents that “one-third of all new communities in Southern California are gated, and the percentage is similar around Phoenix, Arizona, the suburbs of Washington, DC and parts of Florida” (Low 2005, 86). These private associations frequently do the work that the state once did—pick up trash, organize security, and maintain the associations’ “common” property. These once-public functions are not only being absorbed and regulated by private associations, the services are offered only to property owners.

These private spaces, made possible through public infrastructure and funding, create class- and race-based enclaves through continuous surveillance, and these private spaces require and produce fear. Gated or protected communities, with private security firms and continuous surveillance, are

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needed because of the fear of strangers. The rampant fear of stranger sexual assault on children requires sex offender-free neighborhoods. These fears reshape public and private spaces, expand the punitive functions of the state, and also produce identities. Privatizing public spaces and institutions has long required the production of disposable identities from the "welfare queen" to the "lazy illegal alien" (Duggan 2003; Hancock 2004). These identities become integral to the reconfiguration of public institutions and state resources, and the SO is not so different. From welfare, to prison, to public education, demonizing recipients of benefits is one clear way to call into question the legitimacy of a public institution or program and to assert the importance of market-driven regulation. Inversely, protection is another way to reconfigure public entities. The public domains of parks, schools, mass transit, and the internet are too dangerous for vulnerable citizens, therefore they must be under continuous surveillance and cannot be entrusted to inefficient public bureaucrats or entities. Only private companies can adequately manage security.

In particular, the feelings of disgust and fear, instrumental to privatization and produced through the specter of the SO, have been expertly harnessed by the right. The fear of terrorist violence in your neighborhood, of "illegal aliens" taking your jobs, of welfare "freeloaders" and prisoners using your hard-earned dollars, of the deviant sex offender teaching your children—the feelings of disgust, fear, and anger produced by and through these identities become rationalizations to expand the punitive arm of the state and to contract its social-service functions. The state's response is not to empower communities through local community economic development or more public dollars and support for public education, but to heighten individualist responses, to increase privatization and punitive state surveillance. The fearful feelings invite tough love, a defensive and protective "daddy" state, while the feelings of anger fuel more accountability from the public sphere and justify the dismantling of public programs. The fears and feelings about SOs that exploded throughout the 1990s (Jenkins 1998; Levine 2002) occurred concurrently with the growth in the construction of supermax, or control-unit, prisons. A 2006 study by the Urban Institute charts the rarity of supermax prisons prior to 1986, yet by "2004, 44 states had supermax prisons" (Mears 2006, 1). These institutions, which keep men (and a few women) incarcerated in solitary confinement cells from twenty-two to twenty-three hours a day, were made possible through public discourses about the "worst
of the worst” criminals who constituted such a public danger. The public panic about SOs that grew in the 1990s cannot be seen in isolation from the explosion of construction of control units in the 1990s. SORs are a central component of a larger PIC that is also privatizing and reconfiguring public domains, and impacting communities of color.

Although recent studies demonstrate that (convicted) SOs are more likely than the rest of the prison population to be “representative of the U.S. population: they are more likely than other felony offenders to be white, middle-class, and married; they are also less likely to have a history of prior convictions than other classes of serious offenders” (Corrigan 2006, 280; see also Greenfeld 1997), the consequences of the expansion of SORs impact communities and individuals beyond the men on the SOR. SORs continue the regulation and surveillance of public spaces and institutions inhabited and used by the working poor. The restrictions impact men on the SOR, but they also participate in the larger climate of the criminalization of public space and the practices of profiling, specifically racial profiling, by punitive state institutions. Surveillance is not race-neutral. African Americans and Latinos are under surveillance even when they are statistically documented to be the least likely to be culpable.

African-American women were stopped at customs at a rate eight times greater than that for white males, even when white males far outnumber any demographic group of travelers. Customs’ own study revealed that in 1997, an incredible 46 percent of African-American women were strip-searched at O’Hare Airport. Even so, black women are found to be the least likely to be carrying drugs: at 80 percent, the percentage of negative searches was greatest for African-American women. (Johnson 2003, 43)

Despite the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ attempts to suppress these data (Eggen 2005), racialized surveillance is a clear pattern throughout major punitive and “security” institutions: schools, police, and customs and immigration (Skiba et al. 2000; Allard 2002; Rodríguez 2008). Clearly, safety or the public good is not the motivator of this increased surveillance on selected communities of color. And, surveillance practices, for protection, reproduce existing, persistent, race and gender stereotypes about crime and criminals.10

Rose Corrigan hypothesizes that the future for laws surrounding registration and/or notification for SOs, such as Megan’s Law, will follow the imple-
mentation of other mandatory sentencing initiatives across the U.S. and will not be applied uniformly. She states that that the increasing stigma attached to registration as an SO, the “stranger danger” assumptions built into existing laws, and the inability of existing laws to see patriarchy (even loopholes that exempt incest perpetrators from having to register) as central to violence against women, will result in a future where the laws will be applied inconsistently, and will lead to the subsequent redefinition of a sex offender.

I suspect that the effects of Megan’s Law will mirror those of mandatory sentencing: the unwillingness of police, prosecutors, judges, and juries to expose nonstereotypical sex offenders to registration and notification laws will significantly decrease rates of arrest, prosecution, plea bargaining, and sentencing, especially in cases of incest, spousal assault, and acquaintance rape. These “borderline” cases may be shifted to nonsex crimes charges to avoid the reach of the law. If my suspicions are correct, Megan’s Law may become a tautology: all sex offenders will come to be seen as sexual predators, but only those defendants who fit the preconceived profile of a sexual predator will be recognized as sex offenders. This could actually decrease the number of individuals convicted of sex crimes. (Corrigan 2006, 306)

Corrigan’s suggestion seems far from implausible. SORs will continue to disproportionally impact poor people, and will rely on, and augment, preconceived conceptions of the sex offender in the U.S., which are still intimately linked to racialized stereotypes.

There is little to suggest that SORs reduce violence against women and children. Rather, evidence demonstrates that SORs participate in ignoring and even protecting a central site of sexualized violence, the patriarchal family. Such violence is not the only result of the increased focus on developing SORs in the PIC. With their focus on protecting children, SORs also reproduce meanings about childhood, and circulate in a carceral landscape where the categories of youth, childhood, and juvenile are not static.

Part 2

What is at stake? Childhood, Motherhood, and Innocence
As discussed, SORs were established to protect children from harm. What are the defining characteristics of this population—children—or its
equally slippery constructs—youth, juveniles, or adolescents—that enable these protections or benefits? All children and youth do not benefit from an affiliation with these characteristics, and increasingly some are excluded from possessing the central characteristic of childhood that affords significant benefits: innocence. And as an important corollary, only selected representations of patriarchal motherhood are afforded the right to participate in this protected category. Childhood, like other categories such as adolescence, is a shifting and invented construct (Ariès 1962; Polakow 1992; 2000; Lesko 2001). The debates within the field of childhood history are outside the scope of this article, but I do want to illustrate that the core characteristic of childhood and motherhood—innocence—continues not to be available to all, and that this core characteristic animates a dynamic that requires both the expansion of the PIC and the production of unfit mothers and “bad” kids. These categories are embedded in race, class, and ability politics. What is at stake, and often rendered invisible in public discussions of SORs, is that while selected mothers and children are seen as political entities worthy of protection, others are not. This is clearly visible in the current juvenile justice system in the U.S.

Despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s rather positive 2005 decision not to execute juveniles (Lane 2005), in the last decade, states have lowered the age that a child can be held accountable and tried in a juvenile court and raised the number of children moved into adult court. These shifts expand the definition of who is culpable and therefore punishable (Dohrn 2000, 175). Children and juveniles are frequently moved into the court through the educational system. For example, in Florida in 2007, six-year-old Desre’e Watson had a tantrum in her kindergarten class. After twenty minutes of “uncontrollable behavior” in the kindergarten class, the school called the police. The police report reads, “black female. Six years old. Thin build. Dark complexion,” and she was handcuffed, taken to the police station, photographed, and charged with battery on a school official, which is a felony, and two misdemeanors: disruption of a school function and resisting a law enforcement officer (Herbert 2007).

According to the authorities, there were no other options. “The student became violent,” said Frank Mercurio, the no-nonsense chief of the Avon Park police. “She was yelling, screaming—just being uncontrollable. Defiant.” “But she was 6,” I said. The chief’s reply came faster
than a speeding bullet: “Do you think this is the first 6-year-old we’ve arrested?” (Herbert 2007)

While children who are six years old, such as Watson, are being moved into juvenile court, fourteen- and fifteen- and sixteen-year-old juveniles are being transferred to adult court either automatically or through a process known as the “direct file transfer” where the prosecutor uses “his or her sole discretion in determining whether a child is to be charged in juvenile or adult court” (Dohrn 2000, 177). These processes clearly expand the courts’ jurisdiction, yet they grotesquely impact youth of color. The National Center on Crime and Delinquency documents the staggeringly disproportionate incarceration rates for youth of color at every level of the system, and highlights that youth of color are more likely than white youth to be removed from the home, transferred to adult court, sent to adult prison, and more.

African American youth are detained at 4.5 times the rate of White youth. Latino youth are detained at 2.3 times the rate of White youth. African American youth are 16% of youth in the general population but 58% of youth admitted to state adult prison. African American youth are more likely than White youth to be formally charged in juvenile court and to be sentenced to out-of-home placement, even when referred for the same offense, and according to the latest available data, three out of four of the 4,100 new admissions of youth to adult prisons were youth of color. (Krisberg 2007, 1)

As legal categories conferring particular privileges, neither “childhood” nor “juvenile” is available to all. As public discourses about child protection expand, the conception of who is permitted to be a child shrinks.

Inconsistencies about the categories of “child” and “juvenile” are also apparent when comparing ages of consent across institutions. Most nations (and sometimes the provinces or states within nations) establish ages of consent that demarcate when youth can give informed consent to participate in civic life and practices that might be harmful. For example, there are differing ages of consent to work, participate in sexual acts, vote, consume alcohol, drive, and use tobacco. The establishment and enforcement of these ages of consent have varied across gender, race, and class, and geographically—from nation to nation, and within nations, from region to region. A cursory comparison adequately illustrates that these official ages are less
about child protection and more about safeguarding the construction of
colorado. For example, while those who are fifteen can be culpable and
accountable for crimes as adults, the state protects that same age cohort
through the enactment of laws that stipulate that a fifteen- or sixteen-year-
old is not able to consent to sexual acts (Fine and McClelland 2006). While
most states, including Illinois, require and sanction an abstinence-based
sex-education curriculum because those in school are too young to be
sexual, the courts don’t blink when sentencing the same body to an adult
prison. Examining the impact of policies from sex education to juvenile
justice illustrates just how “deeply state policies slice into the seemingly
private lives of very differently situated youth, most particularly those with
no private safety net” (Fine and McClelland 2006, 326).

Just as the category of “child” or “deviant” contracts or expands to
accommodate our nation’s goals for particular gendered and racialized
bodies, motherhood has similar political and economic flexibilities. As
representatives of the victims, and as mothers, the mothers of Polly Klaas
and Megan Kanka played visible and powerful roles to establish national
systems to register child sex offenders (Terry 2003). While white mother-
hood played an instrumental public role in drawing media and political
support for SORs, feminist advocates were invisible “during the emergency
legislative session after the murder of Megan Kanka” (Corrigan 2006, 308).
The decades of work by feminist legal scholars and grassroots organizers
that changed rape laws were not evident in these public, often maternal,
strategies to create SORs. Feminist legal scholar Rose Corrigan, in her
detailed research, points out that “[t]he most threatening aspects of
feminist rape law reform—its criticisms of violence, sexuality, family, and
repressive institutions—are those that supporters of Megan’s Law erode in
rhetoric and practice” (Corrigan 2006, 276).

Maternalistic movements are credited with advancing or establishing a
number of public policies, specifically those that benefit worthy children,
families, and women: Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC),
widows’ pensions, maximum-hour work laws, and minimum-wage laws
(Hancock 2004). Motherhood can be a political force, one of the few tools
uniquely available to women to engage in political discourse and to advance
reforms, frequently termed “municipal housekeeping.” Yet, when women, or
mothers, engage in public-policy discourse, maternalism can also be used to
trivialize their political work, even if being mothers is not their motivation or
their strategy for participating. Political scientist Ange-Marie Hancock examines the history of white women's roles in the development of social welfare programs in the U.S. to demonstrate that white women (and to a lesser extent bourgeois black women) used their social and political position as mothers to advocate for social welfare programs for "lesser" but still "worthy" women. This strategy has resulted in longer-term political and social costs: paternalism and the reinforcement of a racialized and gendered nation-state.

Many women's arguments for public poverty alleviation programs were tied to nationalist ideology, which is itself predicated on a specific theory of gender difference. . . . Nationalism requires a specific construction of women as mothers to justify many of its political prescriptions. Although considered the part of the nation who transmitted and produced national culture, women, as biological reproducers of the national, also represented the boundaries to be preserved by means of restrictions on sexual and marital relations. (Hancock 2004, 29)

While motherhood continues to be a viable avenue for selected women to wield power in the public realm, as a strategy motherhood reproduces gendered and racialized meanings attached to motherhood for the nation-state.

Assumptions about which women are fit to be mothers are embedded in policies and corresponding practices across the U.S. For example: some states actively prohibit same-sex adoptions or foster parenting, even by single women or men, because gay and lesbians are too sexually suspect to be worthy parents (Perry 2007). Women with disabilities are frequently denied the right to be sexual, much less to parent (Garland-Thomson 2002; Wilkerson 2002). First Nations women across North America continue to lack adequate reproductive rights, which is intimately linked to histories of forced sterilizations because they were perceived to be unfit to reproduce or to parent (Smith 2005).

African American families continue to be disproportionately negatively impacted by the child welfare system (and the prison industrial complex) and by the assumptions that African-American families, specifically women, are less capable of parenting than others (Roberts 1997). These biases are built into policies and practices.

White children who are abused or neglected are twice as likely as black children to receive services in their own homes, avoiding the emotional damage and physical risks of foster care placement. . . . Put another
way, most white children who enter the system are permitted to stay with their families, while most black children are taken away from theirs. . . . Once removed from their homes, black children remain in foster care longer, are moved more often, receive fewer services, and are less likely to be either returned home or adopted than any other children. (Roberts 2003, 173)

Although poverty might be the universal reason that children end up in the system (or in prison), persistent white supremacy also shapes how mothers and families interact with our child protection and welfare systems. Stereotypes about which kinds of mothers are less reformable, “unfit,” “lazy,” or “unworthy” shape practices and public policies. For example, while formal restrictions against women of color being able to access AFDC were dropped, women of color continued to be denied access to benefits through “failure to pass the ‘morals’ tests, assessments of laziness even when women were working and suffering from extreme employment discrimination” (Hancock 2004, 36-37). When these data from child welfare agencies is coupled with juvenile justice data, the bias against black families, specifically mothers, is stark.

When White youth and African American youth were charged with the same offenses, African American youth with no prior admissions were six times more likely to be incarcerated in public facilities than White youth with the same background. (Krisberg 2007, 2)

Queer parents, single mothers, and/or women of color do not have the same ability to use the status of motherhood to leverage public policies. When Elvira Arellano, the undocumented mother of a documented child, Saul, refused deportation and stayed for a year in a church in Chicago, motherhood did not afford her political privilege. Instead, a mainstream-right backlash developed against immigrant mothers who give birth in the U.S. to documented children; as they have been termed “incubators,” or women who come to the U.S. to give birth to “anchor babies” (Hooton and Henriquez 2006). Arellano’s political work was perceived, by some, as evidence that she was a bad mother (Olkon and Sekter 2007). When the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) children’s TV show “Postcards to Buster” visited two lesbian moms and their three kids in Vermont, U.S. Education Secretary Margaret Spellings critiqued the show, and PBS and affiliates
pulled the episode (Boehlert 2005). The dairy-farming, civil-unionized, Vermont lesbian mothers are threatening and deviant representations of motherhood, unfit for mainstream public consumption.

While innocence is “a lot like air in your tires: there is not a lot you can do with it but lose it” (Kincaid 1998, 53), innocence is not conferred equally at birth. Just as selected children have access to innocence, selected white and heterosexual mothers and families are prioritized as de facto good mothers or families that can mobilize both public sentiment and reshape public policies. The definition of motherhood, and who can wield this status to impact public policy, is still intimately interconnected to race and national reproduction. SORs were built with the support of this maternalist model, constructed on narrow definitions of vulnerable children (and mothers), and consequently afford protection only to particular children. Bodies that do not fit—undocumented, black, disabled, queer, or non-gender-conforming—do not command the same empathy or political capital to engage in municipal housekeeping, and they are at risk of being viewed as unfit parents, “at risk” youth, or not as children or “juveniles” but as adults.

Part 3

IMAGINING ABOLITION, TRANSFORMING JUSTICE
This article tracks how sex offender registries and community notification laws contribute to a culture of fear manifested in stranger danger that functions to displace responsibility from patriarchy for violence against children and women. The expansion of the SOR contributes to the criminalization of public space and participates in producing public feelings (disgust, fear) that work to legitimate surveillance and incarceration technologies at the core of the PIC. Deconstructing SORs in the context of concurrent shifts in our juvenile justice and child welfare system illustrates how motherhood and childhood afford benefits and privileges to some women and children and not to others, and how the categories at the center of SORs—vulnerable and innocent children—seemingly require the expansion of the prison industrial complex. Finally, as briefly discussed, there are persistently disquieting histories and implications in any discussion of deviance, in the context of pervasive and compulsive heteronormativity.

While feminist, anti-racist, queer-positive, activist organizing that responds to the tensions outlined in this article is relatively minimal, there
are smaller organizations raising some of these questions. Generation Five is dedicated to ending violence against children in five generations without state intervention; Stop It Now, also focused on challenging child sexual abuse, provides a hotline that includes offering confidential resources for adults; Critical Resistance works toward ending the nation’s prison industrial complex; Young Women’s Empowerment Project offers peer-to-peer harm reduction for youth in the sex trade; and INCITE! uses direct action and grassroots organizing to end violence against women of color and communities of color.14 Each of these organizations works to make change without stigmatizing populations, and without using and legitimizing punitive state systems. These organizations recognize that violence against women and children in our communities is intimately linked to other forms of oppression—white supremacy, heteronormativity—and that “the state apparatus, which is mandated to uphold human rights, is one of the worst rights abusers” (Faith 2000, 165). Directly or indirectly, these organizations advance an abolitionist agenda. Abolition literally means to work to abolish prisons, and to end the state’s over-reliance on punishment and incarceration as a mechanism to address violence. Prison abolition doesn’t mean that there will be no problems or violence, but rather that locking people in cages is not a just or efficient solution to the problems that lead folks to commit crimes. As Angela Davis (and others) suggest, prison abolitionists do not argue that crimes do not occur, or that people do not do “bad things,” but that incarceration is an invention intimately linked to capitalism, slavery, colonization, the oppression of women, and more. This work must be transformative and multifaceted:

The work for prison abolition is at once a policy issue, a community accountability issue, a family issue, and an issue that must be understood to be deeply personal. It is about health, neighborhood, the environment, U.S. position in global markets, youth empowerment, spirituality, the upcoming election, interpersonal relationships, identity politics, and many more things. (Richie 2008, 24)

As Beth Richie outlines, and as this article documents, to build stronger communities we must transform our conceptions of what makes us secure and what makes our lives and communities just. Public dialogues about sexual and other forms of intimate violence have the radical potential to participate in shifting collective ideas about health and safety in homes and
communities, subsequently to move conceptions about childhood, sexuality, family, and to implicate patriarchy. Publicly analyzing and critiquing SORs should be at the forefront of this work because SORs raise, as this article has demonstrated, central questions about building sustainable anti-prison movements that center the lives of women as those most vulnerable. But further research, grounded in local organizing, is needed to document and theorize how these dialogues work in communities.

We cannot wait for policy-makers to shift; we must start on our own blocks, on our worksites, with our neighbors, and in our faith organizations. I close by grounding this article in the personal, because this is where the questions emerge for me, and also where I believe the most powerful, and difficult, political work must happen. In 2001 I collaboratively started a free, diploma-based high school for formerly incarcerated men and women in Chicago. Our school offers a community-based environment that values prior learning and is designed for men and women who have been out of formal educational contexts for many years. Teaching and learning in this school, in addition to other work in prisons and jails, continues to educate me that the policies, practices, and categories supporting our prison nation are never neutral, and regardless of the violence that is perpetrated by individuals, punishment and incarceration generally create more problems. With few educational opportunities, limited and poor quality health care, no meaningful job training initiatives, few or no drug or alcohol rehabilitation programs, the conditions in prisons ensure that those exiting prisons will not be in any better physical, economic, or mental shape than those who enter. My work and experiences shaped me to seriously consider and imagine life without prisons: abolition. Prison abolition does not mean that there will be no problems, violence, or conflict; rather, our current incarceration system is not a just or efficient solution to the problems that lead folks to commit crimes. Prisons have been used across the United States, as Angela Davis writes, as “a way of disappearing people in the false hope of disappearing the underlying social problems they represent” (Davis 2005, 41).

While our school never asks for criminal histories, male participants often disclose mobility or employment restrictions that they attribute to registration as an “SO.” I initially tried to ignore my reactions of anger and repulsion because these feelings made me uncomfortable, and because confessions of participation in other violent and intimate crimes—murder, robbery—never equaled my emotional responses to hearing people identify as an SO. While I
worked hard to not pay attention to SO issues, the feelings kept emerging. Anger. Repulsion. In a nation-state where hetero-patriarchy and white supremacy are so central to everyday life, it felt logical for me to question and dismantle the prison system, but vaguely anti-feminist to expend any emotional or intellectual energy on, overwhelmingly, men convicted of acts of violence against women and children. Initially, I rationalized this political conflict between my anti-prison and my feminist organizing and allegiances as simply a personal issue. My conflict and my feelings of repulsion arose because too many women in my life have been assaulted by men—uncles, ministers, boyfriends, fathers, coaches, employers, teachers—and I didn’t believe, fundamentally, that these men could be rehabilitated. Yet, as the public rhetoric surrounding SOs became more entrenched, and my commitment to thinking and practicing abolition grew, I recognized a need to ask questions, to explore my feelings and to consider how they support the PIC.

I still struggle with these connections, but these contexts and relationships are what motivated me to research, reframe, and challenge both the construction of the SO and SORs. In a nation with no adequate or affordable child-care system, no universal health care, expensive to prohibitive costs for higher education, and a minimum wage that is not a living wage, we have no registries for the officials and employers who routinely elect to implement policies that actively damage all people, including or even particularly children. And what is the “greatest” enemy of childhood? “Poverty is the single greatest risk factor for almost every ‘life-smashing’ condition a kid might be at risk for” (Levine 2002, 220). Just as drug-free zones around schools do not reduce youth’s drug usage but instead criminalize entire communities, and “tough on crime” laws and the “war on terror” don’t make us any safer, expanding SORs does not reduce persistent, often state-sanctioned, violence.

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NOTES
1. Women, specifically women of color, are one of the fastest growing prison populations in the U.S. In Illinois (where I currently reside), between 1983 and
2002 the number of women in prison for drug-related crimes skyrocketed from 32 to 1,325, a 4,041 percent leap (Institute for Metropolitan Affairs 2006, sec 1:4). This growth is mirrored across the U.S. Research clearly documents that incarcerated women are undereducated, under- or unemployed, frequently homeless prior to entering prison or jail, and have a significantly higher rate of experiences with sexual or physical violence (Richie 1996; Faith 2005). Poverty is a “common denominator,” as, “if a woman is not poor when she enters prison, she will be when she leaves” (Faith 2005, 5).

2. In Illinois, with a population of approximately twelve million, there are few services available for the over 30,000 people who exit prisons and jails every year and return mainly to six of Chicago’s seventy-seven neighborhoods that are the most economically disadvantaged: Austin, Humboldt Park, North Lawndale, Englewood, West Englewood, and East Garfield Park (La Vigne et al. 2003).

3. Organizations and movements, never monolithic, are composed of individuals who often challenge their organization's mandates. And, frequently, the “on the ground” work of an organization looks very different from their stated mission. Yet, the National Organization for Women (NOW) (http://www.now.org/), National Coalition Against Domestic Violence (http://www.ncadv.org), V-DAY (http://newsite.vday.org/), and the Human Rights Campaign (http://www.hrc.org/) offer no public materials to challenge SORs.

4. See also Humphreys 1970, 83-93, for a description of the use of police and state resources to monitor public male sex through the use of hidden cameras, decoys, and other mechanisms of surveillance.

5. Illinois, like many states, allocates increasingly more resources to incarceration than to education: “The cost of incarcerating one adult in Illinois is approximately four and a half times the cost of one child’s annual education. The cost of imprisoning one individual is estimated to be between $20,637 and $25,900 per year. Meanwhile, Illinois mandates only $5,164 per child per year for public education. In 2005, $1.21 billion were allocated for corrections, which represents a 221 percent, or more than three-fold, increase over 1990 figures” (Institute for Metropolitan Affairs 2006).

6. Several states have addressed this issue, such as Massachusetts, by requiring that an administrative hearing be held for every individual before they are assigned to be monitored by a registry, or that registration as a sex offender does not encompass consensual sex acts that are still or were once criminalized (Jacobsen 1999).

7. For example, until 1993 North Carolina law stated that “a person may not be prosecuted under this article if the victim is the person’s legal spouse at the time of the commission of the alleged rape or sexual offense unless the parties are living separate and apart” (National Center for Victims of Crime 2004).

8. There has been a move to enable deduction of these fees from one’s taxes (Low 2005, 98), but as yet this has not met with widespread success. Suburban, gated communities (as opposed to urban, walled ones) require urban tax
dollars and use urban resources, but frequently benefit from lower taxation rates in non-urban contexts.

9. Berlant further argues that the use of sentiment by the right actually masks the acts of privatization. "[P]ublic masculinization of sentiment by the Republicans serves as a screen for the privatization of the state, for the divestiture of the federal government of responsibility for many of our nation's citizens. The phrase 'compassionate conservative' is also code for the federal turn to faith based organizations to undertake what could be called spiritual and social work with public dollars" (Berlant 2004, 61-62).

10. One clear consequence of this hyper-surveillance is that communities of color are tracked into further state control and management. If the rate of drug usage or speeding is relatively equal across all racial groups, yet police are not examining one group and are targeting another, a higher percentage of those targeted will be caught. "Although African Americans only represent 13% of all monthly drug users (consistent with their proportion of the population), they account for 35% of those arrested for drug possession, 55% of drug possession convictions and 74% of those sentenced to prison for drug possession. Latinas and African American women are disproportionately incarcerated for drug offenses compared to their white, and male, counterparts. In 1997, 44% of Hispanic women and 39% of African American women incarcerated in state prisons were convicted of drug offenses, compared to 23% of white women, and 34% and 26% of African American and Hispanic men, respectively" (Allard 2002, 26).

11. Corrigan analyzes Megan's Law in New Jersey and notes: "The Guidelines dwell at length on the harms done by strangers, though they rarely acknowledge that the types of assaults most feared by the public—the physically violent penetrative rape of a child by a stranger—are a tiny fraction of assaults" (Corrigan 2006, 291). In addition, "The Manual regularly refers to feminist understandings or language about rape, but without addressing any of the associated critiques of violence, gender, or inequality that were central to the feminist antirape movement. The experts on rape are no longer feminists, victim advocates, or even victims themselves, but instead 'mental health and legal experts' whose institutional and disciplinary frameworks explicitly preclude viewing rape as a product of systemic or class-based violence" (288).

12. Child-protection laws, advocated for by mothers (and fathers) of victims more so than in any other sphere, are named after the children who were killed—Jessica's Law, Megan's Law, Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Amber Alert (after Amber Hagerman).

13. Municipal housekeeping: "a city wide agenda which implied not just social betterment, but also the institutionalization of a publicly financed welfare structure, modeled on the ideal caring home and community" (Rousmaniere 1999, 153).
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