

**IS HISTORY POSSIBLE?
A PROLEGOMENON TO AN AGNOSTIC EPISTEMOLOGY**

Gregory Holmes Singleton

Professor of History, Emeritus

Sixth Annual Faculty Research and Creative Activities Symposium

Northeastern Illinois University

November 13, 2015

It is a pleasure to be back at this university where I spent the vast majority of my career. It was here that I formulated questions that now consume me in retirement, and I am grateful to my colleagues for giving me wide latitude in exploring heretical notions. Most of them actually encouraged my subversive musings.

Therefore, when I received the request for proposals for this symposium I was delighted, but also surprised. I wondered why anyone would care to know what those of us who have been put out to pasture are doing these days in between our appointments with various health care specialists. It then occurred to me that this could be an excellent opportunity for the current faculty—whether new, or in mid-career, or senior—to have a good look at several examples of the species *homo emeritus*; a sort of glimpse into their futures, for better or for worse. Toward that end, I will give a brief overview of the project in which I am now engaged and then narrow the focus to a specific portion of that work in progress. As my informal excursus unfolds you will discover that in many ways my trajectory from graduate school preparation in the late 1960s, through my career from 1970 to 2005, and finally to my life in retirement for the last decade can be summarized in Bob Dylan’s classic refrain, “Ah, but I was so much older then; I’m younger than that now.”

The larger project, of which this presentation is a small sampling, has the working title “The Examined Life: Communities of Interpretation, Perpetual Learning, and the Evolving Self.” It is in part a reflection on my career, the discipline of history, and the academy generally during that time seen from the perspective of ten years into retirement. More importantly it is about critical thinking and self-examination. While it is not a work of formal epistemology, questions about the nature of knowledge, how we come to know what we claim to know, and the characteristics of the knower are central and persistent concerns. This is a large and complex project, but I will attempt to provide a brief overview with this bit of verse I wrote as a reminder to myself about where I was headed:

When we say "I know"
What makes it so?
Some say it's reason,
But with every season
Or sometimes daily,
Sadly or gaily,
Reason leads us
To different places.

Some say it's evidence
Whether given by providence
Or gathered with senses,
Such as tax rolls or census,
But oblique rotations give me the creeps
And orthogonal rotations make me weep.

Some claim "I know in my heart of hearts,"
But that makes of knowledge only an art
Of subjective projection of presupposition
Perhaps used for some nefarious mission.

Some say it's found in Holy Writ,
But let's think on that for a bit.
Appeal to authority is problematic
Whether Bible, or Pope, or sayings dogmatic.
It begs further questions that multiply rapidly
Degenerating to words used vapidly.

Perhaps we should just admit that we guess
Or form perspectives which I must confess
Is not nearly as cool as saying "I know."
But for the sake of honesty it's this route I'll go.

This bit of doggerel, of course, provides no answers. Indeed, it leads to more questions. In order to make this brief presentation more manageable, I will limit myself to the discipline of history (although my research and speculations have taken me far beyond my academic specialty).

And this takes us back to the Dylan refrain.

As I emerged from graduate school and immediately morphed into a faculty member at the age of 29 I was absolutely certain about what I knew, a believer in the absolute certainty of knowledge in general, and equally certain that I was full of it . . . knowledge that is. Though wet behind the ears, I was an old and wise soul; a legend in my own mind. Now that I am a much younger 75 year-old I am far less certain about what I know, doubtful about my ability—anyone’s ability actually—to know anything of great consequence with certainty, but relatively confident that at 29 I was indeed full of it . . . and I don’t mean knowledge.

In retrospect, it should not have taken me so long to come to the realization that my epistemology is fueled by an abiding agnosticism. My graduate education was a constant assault on the conventions of what used to be called “scientific history,” which might far better be called simply “naïve empiricism.” Among the faculty I worked with were some of the sharpest skeptical minds in the profession, including (but not limited to) Gary Nash, Keese Bolle, Richard Weiss, Lauro Martines, Donald Meyer, Stephen Thernstrom, Hayden White, and Lynn White. In graduate seminars every shred of evidence was subjected to endless cross-examination. Every interpretation was dissected and discarded as problematic.

However, I was getting mixed signals from the faculty outside of the seminar rooms. When serving as a TA in the undergraduate survey courses it became clear that skepticism was reserved for those of us at the graduate level. In the presence of undergraduates smooth unproblematic narratives tripped off the tongues of those very professors who urged the doctoral students to avoid such tempting but intellectually dishonest constructs. With three exceptions, the conflation of the complexities into simple narratives could also be seen in their published works as well. The three exceptions were practitioners of analytical history as an alternative to narrative as the dominant mode of historical exposition. Steve Thernstrom’s *Poverty and Progress* was one of the pioneering works establishing social history as an adjunct of social theory. Hayden White was crafting his challenging piece of historiography, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, when I studied with him. Lynn White’s *Medieval Technology and Social Change* was a contribution to social philosophy as well as history. Yet, even these works—rigorous as they are—present far less nuanced analyses than one would have expected from their authors’ brilliant and demanding leadership in the seminars.

The following passage from the forward to Lynn White’s *Medieval Technology and Social Change* is instructive:

“Voltaire to the contrary, history is a bag of tricks which the dead have played upon historians. The most remarkable of these illusions is the belief that surviving written records provide us with a reasonably accurate facsimile of past human activity. . . If historians are to attempt to write the history of mankind, and not simply the history of mankind as it was viewed by the small and specialized segments of our race which have had the habit of scribbling, they must take a fresh view of the records, ask new questions of them, and use all the resources of archaeology, iconography, and etymology to find answers when no answers can be discovered in contemporary writings.”

This is the boldest statement of what could be called historical agnosticism I have ever read. It immediately struck me when I first read it and I suffered intellectual whiplash when I continued on to the smooth and seamless analysis that followed that preface. I came to realize that some (perhaps most) historians frequently admit significant lacunae and contradictions in the evidence when writing prefaces, forwards and introductions, yet presented smooth, seamless, and confident narratives and analyses. Now in retrospect I see that both in graduate school and the earliest days of my professorial career I was formed more by the behavior of my professors in their survey courses and their publications than I was by their excellent instruction in the graduate seminars where we were encouraged to look at the person behind the curtain pulling the levers.

Thus, the precise simple epistemology I had developed in my late teens persisted. As an undergraduate and graduate student I considered myself something of a rigorous empiricist. Ironically, given my dogmatism on this point, I required that my students unmercifully question everything they previously thought they knew, assuming that this would bring them into the fold of tough-minded pragmatic empiricism—in other words, they would become wise at an early age, just like me. But a funny thing happened which began a transformation that continued throughout my career and on into retirement. I received a letter from a university press expressing interest in my dissertation. Would I consider having it published in a new series on the history of American culture? The answer was an obvious and enthusiastic “Yes.” While transmuting my dissertation into a publishable book manuscript I required of myself the same degree of rigorous self-examination and criticism I imposed on my students. To my chagrin I saw that, while I had discussed the epistemological problems in the introduction and several appendices, the six chapters of the dissertation told a seamless story and offered far too simple and smooth analyses. I critiqued previous interpretations of some of the phenomena I studied as being too facile, then

created narratives and analyses just as facile, but I assured the reader I had the true story and the proper analysis. As a result of facing the embarrassing truth, my confidence in knowledge as firm and fixed began to crumble and the end result was a book that was remarkably different (considerably better—and blessedly much shorter) than the document that had been accepted as the dissertation. Oh, I still told a story that was far too facile and the analyses were still too smooth and seamless, but I did introduce the reader to some of the difficulties in both evidence and interpretive methods. These portions of the book involved lengthy discussions of the questionable reliability of some of the evidence, contradictions between primary sources, and other such conundra. I invited the reader into the problems with the evidence and suggested a range of possible interpretations.

My research and publications following have been characterized by the same kind of invitation to the reader to think along with me. Just to cite one example, I did a good deal of work on the difficulty of interpreting early and mid nineteenth-century political rhetoric from a twentieth-century perspective, and particularly determining precisely what was actually said. I discovered that two different sources (one Whig, the other Democrat) reported precisely the same wording for Senator Henry Clay's chastisement of President Andrew Jackson for withdrawing funds from the Bank of the United States—with the exception of a single word. That one word, however, made all the difference. One publication reported the opening of the famous speech as "We are in the midst of a revolution, although bloodless. . ." The other reported it as "We are in the midst of a revolution, hitherto bloodless. . ." This was prior to the Congressional Record. There is no copy of the speech, nor are there working notes, in the Clay papers. Yet some historians have quoted one or the other source in order to fit the narrative being developed (and not infrequently blithely ignoring the other source). It was during this project that I began to wonder if narrative itself is part of the problem.

Every historian is aware that the record of evidence is woefully incomplete; is skewed toward the interest of prevailing factions, parties, and classes; is created by human beings with preconceptions, assumptions, and a variety of other subjective factors impacting the final outcome of each document. We then are engaged in our subjective interpretations of the subjective reflections of those who generated the original documents. Thus narratives contain projection as well as perception. Obviously the same can be said of analyses.

One could, of course, throw one's hands in the air and conclude that history is indeed impossible, at least history that is accurate. But some sense

of history will most likely be part of both our collective conscious and unconscious for as long as the species persists. In spite of the epistemological and methodological problems I think it quite important that we, both individually and collectively, come to terms with our pasts. Or, more precisely, that we continually come to terms with our pasts by refusing to adopt a firm and final “standard” or “orthodox” interpretation of any given historical question. Indeed, one of the problems I have with narrative history is that the emphasis is always on the answer rather than the question. The answers become concretized, whereas the questions are usually broader than a specific historical moment and the questions need to be kept in play over generations: revisited, revised, revisioned, and reframed.

Similarly, the question, “Is History Possible?” ought to be kept alive. Questions give rise to discussion. Answers give rise to dogma.

But that then opens the question about the nature of an agnostic epistemology. One obvious approach would be to simply invoke David Hume’s *Treatise of Human Nature* and *Enquiries concerning Human Understanding* but I fear that would only fuel the inclination to abandon doing history. If we introduce the category of “perspective” into our epistemic inquiries and table the idea of “knowledge” at least temporarily, we can find some help from a bunch of dead guys and a couple of those still alive: the philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Josiah Royce (1855-1916), and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938); the social theorist Georg Simmel (1858-1918); the psychoanalyst Alfred Adler (1870-1937); and several practitioners of the Sociology of Knowledge, particularly Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (both still with us).

Nietzsche’s contribution to an agnostic epistemology is his “perspectivism” developed in Section 16 of his *Human, All too Human*. To oversimplify a complex concept, if we realize that the formation of a world view is shaped by many factors of which “information” is only one (and not necessarily the most dominant), then we can enter into conversations about our different perspectives in the manner of anthropologists attempting to understand a culture that is not their own rather than insist on the correctness of our culturally and socially conditioned presumed “knowledge.”

Husserl’s phenomenology goes significantly further than Nietzsche’s exploration. If we are to understand not only another’s view of the universe, but our own as well, we must consider that our perceptual world is not entirely—nor even dominantly—one of objects, but of phenomena. That category combines habituation, projection, hope, fear, mythologies, symbols, and the like. A play currently on stage in Chicago, “The Fairytale Lives of Russian Girls,” quite brilliantly explores this insight.

Royce was something of an orange crow among the dominantly pragmatic and positivist practitioners in the United States. He was far more at home with German idealists—particularly those of a Hegelian bent. He held hope for a more effective corporate life for our species and advocated “communities of interpretation” as an alternative to debate and dialectic. Perhaps the best summary of his optimistic prognosis for the human condition is found in his phrase “The Beloved Community”—a term appropriated by many from John Dewey to Martin Luther King and beyond.

Simmel, the great theorist of social forms and social types, has left an enduring legacy in the work of many University of Chicago sociologists over the decades as well as both transactional analysis and symbolic interactionism generally.

Adler is one of the secular trinity responsible for the foundations of depth psychology along with Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung. The distinctive features of Adler’s “individual psychology” are important aids in addressing my concerns with the communal nature of epistemology, particularly his concentration on social interest, community feeling, goal constructs, social encouragement, life tasks, and social embeddedness.

As for Berger and Luckmann, the title of their *magnus opus* is the best summary of their contribution: ***The Social Construction of Reality***.

Nietzsche, Husserl, Berger and Luckmann provide a conceptual backdrop to rethinking an approach to the teaching and writing of history. Taken together, Royce, Simmel and Adler provide structure and process.

So, how would these three thinkers from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries advise us to go forward with doing history? Based in part on speculations fueled admittedly by my own predilections and based in part on several decades of studying their published work and private correspondence, I could imagine the brief answer for each as follows:

ROYCE: *The world in general and the various specific worlds we inhabit (such as academia, our disciplines, our departments, our classes) are best conceived of as progressively realized communities of interpretation. We continually create our social and cultural environments through participation in the conversation that constitutes and sustains our beloved communities. Therefore, you along with your students and your readers are active agents in creating and maintaining those communities.*

SIMMEL: *We are in a perpetually permutating matrix of forms of social interactions with fluid purposes (such as pure sociability or exchange) in which we either strive for the improvement of subjective culture (or the culture of the self) or slothfully settle for an objective culture of mindless conformity. Take the more fruitful route of subjective culture*

and you along with your students and readers will be active agents in creating and maintaining those communities.

ADLER: Socialization and self-realization are inter-related life-long processes—or more correctly they are two outcomes of a complex system of life-long processes, thus the natures of both our selves and our social contexts are protean. Each of us is shaped by the “others” that form our social units and each of us is a shaping “other” for those in our social units. In our various clusters of associates we take on multiple roles at different times. Therefore, you along with your students and readers are active agents in creating and maintaining those communities.

I suggest—the “I” here is Singleton speaking only for Singleton—that the three taken together suggest the following: We are not separate from our reading and listening audiences. We are both consumers and producers in these cultural matrices. We recognize our collegial relationship with other producers, but we also need to be mindful of our collegial relationship with other consumers as well. We need to go beyond conceptual abstractions such as reader response theory and embrace the notion that in our various communities of interpretation we all—whether faculty or students—are both learners and teachers.

Most of us learned fairly early in our teaching careers that we engage our graduate students most effectively when we explain ourselves, admit the flaws in our systematic explorations and involve the seminar in the conversation. Just as most of us quickly learn to abandon the temptation to make disciples of graduate students in favor of making colleagues of them, so we need to go in the same direction with undergraduate students and our readers. In short, we need to risk thinking out loud within our various communities of interpretation rather than packaging ideas to be marketed to them. Most of us realize that as students of that which is human we are dealing with the persistent themes of complexity, ambiguity and contradiction. Let us bring members of our communities into that blooming buzzing confusion rather than shield them from it.

I have only slightly skimmed over the surface of the chapter on the discipline of history, but to briefly outline the major themes I will offer this bit of doggerel I wrote as I started this specific portion of the wanna be book—and yes, that has become an ongoing practice in my writing—at my age it is good to have reminders of what my task is:

The world of historians is curious,
It's not like ordinary time.
Minutes and hours mean nothing,

We start with the present then decline
Into the maze of old parchment
To discover (well, guess) how we got here
As we project what we expect to find.

We trace evidence we mold into episodes
From which we infer complex epics
That are then expanded to epochs
Convincing all but hard-boiled skeptics
That we've discovered the secret code
Of cause and effect in the flow of events
Whether glorious, hum-drum, or septic.

Historians tell stories quite neatly packaged
But let's seek a more honest objective.
Integrity would be better served
If we humbly offered tentative perspectives,
Admitted how much we don't know
And the quicksand base of our suppositions,
Then engage in dialog thoughtfully reflective.

So much for conjuring lofty thoughts and failed attempts at crafting verse; let's get back to what I assume is both the subtext and major reason for this presentation being on the program today—a glimpse at the future for those of you who are presently in faculty ranks (or who aspire to that as your life's work). From the end of my first ten years of retirement I can report that in my eighth decade of life I am far more conceptually adventuresome, joyfully skeptical, and Socratically inquisitive than I have ever been before. One could plausibly interpret this as renewed intellectual vitality. One could equally plausibly interpret this as the giddy delusion of an aged mind. I will leave it to each of you to decide for yourselves which perspective is the better fit and will hold no grudge against those who opt for the latter.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

NARRATIVE HISTORIOGRAPHY

Jacques Barzun, *Clio and the Doctors: History, Psycho-History and Quanto-History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974.

John Burrow, *A History of Histories: Epics, Chronicles, Romances and Inquiries from Herodotus and Thucydides to the Twentieth Century*. New York: Knopf 2008.

John Higham, *History: Professional Scholarship in America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.

John Lukacs, *The Future of History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011.

Remembered Past: John Lukacs on History, Historians, and Historical Knowledge: A Reader ed. By Mark G. Malvasi and Jeffrey O. Nelson. Wilmington: ISI Books, 2005.

ANALYTICAL HISTORIOGRAPHY

Marc Bloch, *Apologie pour l'histoire ou Métier d'historien*. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1949; translated by Peter Putnam as *The Historian's Craft: Reflections on the Nature and Uses of History and the Techniques and Methods of Those Who Write It* by Knopf, 1953.

David Christian, *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004.

Richard Hofstadter, *The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, Parrington*. New York: Knopf, 1968.

David Noble, *Historians Against History : The Frontier Thesis and the National Covenant in American Historical Writing Since 1830*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1965.

Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Murray A. Rae, *History and Hermeneutics*. London: T&T Clark, 2005.

Paul Ricoeur, *Temps et Récit*, 3 vols. Paris: Seuil, 1983-85; translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer and published as *Time and Narrative* by the University of Chicago Press, 1984-88.

Paul Ricoeur, *La Mémoire, l'histoire, l'oubli*. Paris: Seuil, 2003; translated by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer and published as *Memory, History, Forgetting* by the University of Chicago Press, 2004.

SOURCES FOR AN AGNOSTIC EPISTEMOLOGY

DAVID HUME AND EMPIRICISM

David Hume, *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding*. (originally published 1748) best current edition published as *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals* by Oxford University Press, 1975 (eds. L.A. Selby-Bigge and PH. Nidditch).

David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*. (originally published 1739-40) best current edition by Oxford University Press, 2000 (eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton).

G. Dicker, *Hume's Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Introduction*. London and New York: Routledge, 1998.

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE AND PERSPECTIVISM

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches: Ein Buch für freie Geister* Leipzig : C.G. Naumann, 1894; there have been several English editions over the last century; the one recommend is translated by R. J. Hollingdale and published as *Human, All Too Human: a Book for Free Spirits* by Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Steven D. Hales and Rex Welsch, *Nietzsche's Perspectivism*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2000.

Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen, *American Nietzsche: A History of an Icon and His Ideas*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.

EDMUND HUSSERL AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Edmund Husserl, *Méditations cartésiennes: Introduction à la phénoménologie*. Paris: Colin, 193; translated by Dorion Cairns and published as *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology* published by Nijhoff, 1960.

Edmund Husserl, *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*. Halle: Nimeyer, 1928; translated by James S. Churchill and published as *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* by Indiana University Press, 1964.

Alfred Schutz, *Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen welt*. Vienna: Julius Springer, 1932; translated by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert and published as *The Phenomenology of the Social World* by Northwestern University Press, 1967.

ALFRED ADLER

Alfred Adler, *The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1923.

Alfred Adler, *Understanding Human Nature*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1927.

The Collected Works of Alfred Adler, Vols. 1- 12. San Francisco: The Adler Institute of San Francisco and Northwestern Washington, 2005-2012.

JOSHIAH ROYCE

Josiah Royce, *The Hope of the Great Community*. New York: Macmillan, 1916

Josiah Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*. New York: Macmillan, 1908.

Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity* 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1918.

GEORG SIMMEL

Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Form ed. and intro. By Donald N. Levine. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.

Georg Simmel. *The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays* trans. And into. by K Peter Etkorn. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.

[Note: Simmel was primarily an essayist and only a few of his many publications in this format have been translated into English. The most comprehensive bibliographical guide to his published work is found in Kurt Gassen, *Buch des Dankes an Georg Simmel* (Berlin: Dunker & Humbolt, 1958)

SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966.

Kenneth Boulding. *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956.

Karl Mannheim. *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1936.

OTHER AUTHORS MENTIONED IN THE PRESENTATION OR RELEVANT TO CONTINUED DISCUSSION

Dan Barker, *Life Driven Purpose: How an Atheist Finds Meaning*. Durham, NC: Pitchstone Publishing, 2015.

Warren Berger, *A More Beautiful Question: The Power of Inquiry to Spark Breakthrough Ideas*. New York: Bloomsbury, 2014.

Keese Bolle, *The Persistence of Religion: An Essay on Tantrism and Sri Aurobindo's Philosophy*. Leiden: Brill, 1965.

Marshall Brain, *How "God" Works: A Logical Inquiry on Faith*. New York: Sterling, 2014.

Daniel Calhoun, *The Intelligence of a People*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973.

Norman F. Cantor, *Inventing the Middle Ages: The Lives, Works, and Ideas of the Great Medievalists of the Twentieth Century*. New York: William Morrow, 1991.

Matthew B. Crawford, *The World Beyond Your Head: On Becoming an Individual in an Age of Distraction*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015.

Natalie Zemon Davis, “Discussant’s comment on ‘Cultural Encounters between the Continents and the Centuries,’” in *Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Congress of Historical Sciences* (Oslo: Nasjonalbiblioteket, 2000), pp. 46-47.

John Demos, *A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

David Hackett Fischer, *Toward a Logic of Historical Thought*. New York: Harper & Row, 1970.

Philip Greven, *The Protestant Temperament: Patterns of Child-Rearing, Religious Experience, and the Self in Early America*. New York: Knopf, 1977.

Steve Hagen, *Why the World Doesn’t Seem to Make Sense: An Inquiry into Science, Philosophy, and Perception*. Boulder: Sentient, 2012.

Christopher Hill *Puritanism and Revolution: Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century*. London: Secker and Warburg, 1958.

Jennifer Michael Hecht, *Doubt: A History: The Great Doubters and their Legacy of Innovation from Socrates and Jesus to Thomas Jefferson and Emily Dickinson*. New York: HarperOne, 2003.

Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.

Kenneth A. Lockridge. *A New England Town: The First Hundred Years, Dedham, Massachusetts 1636-1736*. New York: Norton, 1970.

Lauro Martines, *The Social World of the Florentine Humanists, 1390-1460*. Princeton, NJ: 1963.

Donald B. Meyer, *The Positive Thinkers: The American Quest for Health, Wealth and Personal Power from Mary Baker Eddy to Norman Vincent Peale*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.

Donald B. Meyer, *The Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919-1941*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960.

Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century*. New York: Macmillan, 1939.

Perry Miller, *The New England Mind: From Colony to Province*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945.

David Sehat, *The Jefferson Rule: How the Founding Fathers Became Infallible and Our Politics Inflexible*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015.

Gregory Holmes Singleton, "Birth, Rebirth, and the 'New Negro' of the 1920s," *PHYLON: A Review of Race and Culture* (March 1982).

Gregory Holmes Singleton, "Fundamentalism and Urbanization: A Quantitative Critique of Impressionistic Interpretations," in *The New Urban History: Quantitative Explorations by American Historians*, ed. Leo Schnore. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Gregory Holmes Singleton, "The Genesis of Suburbia: A Complex of Historical Trends," in *The Urbanization of the Suburbs*, eds. Louis H. Masotti and Jeffrey Hadden. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1973.

Gregory Holmes Singleton, "'Mere Middle-Class Institutions': Urban Protestantism in Nineteenth-Century America," *Journal of Social History* (Summer 1973).

Gregory Holmes Singleton, "Popular Culture or the Culture of the Populace?" *Journal of Popular Culture* (Summer 1977)

Gregory Holmes Singleton, "Protestant Voluntary Associations and the Making of Victorian America," *American Quarterly* (December 1975); reprinted in *Victorian America*, ed. Daniel Howe (Philadelphia: University

of Pennsylvania Press, 1976)

Gregory Holmes Singleton, "Quantification in History: A Qualitative Look," *Albion: A Journal of British Studies* (Spring 1973).

Gregory Holmes Singleton, *Religion in the City of Angels: American Protestant Culture and Urbanization, Los Angeles 1850-1930*. Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1979.

Page Smith, *Killing the Spirit: Higher Education in America*. New York: Viking, 1990.

C. P. Snow, *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959.

Stephan Thernstrom, *Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth-Century City*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Michael Walzer, *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Richard Weiss, *The American Myth of Success: From Horatio Alger to Norman Vincent Peale*. New York: Basic Books, 1969.

Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.

Lynn White, Jr., *Medieval Technology and Social Change*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Gene Wise, *American Historical Explanations: A Strategy for Grounded Inquiry*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1973; 2nd edition, revised, 1980.

EVIDENCE OF THE NEED FOR AN AGNOSTIC EPISTEMOLOGY IN OTHER DISCIPLINES

Richard J. Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976.

Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*. New York: Basic Books, 1970.

Gary Greenberg, *The Book of Woe: The DSM and the Unmaking of Psychiatry*. New York: Blue Rider Press, 2013.

Daniel J. Kevles, *The Baltimore Case: A Trial of Politics, Science, and Character*. New York: Norton, 1998.

Daniel J. Kevles, *The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America*. New York: Knopf, 1978.

Walter Kaufmann, *Critique of Religion and Philosophy*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958.

Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University Press, 1962; second edition, enlarged, 1970.

Barry Alan Shain, *The Myth of American Individualism: The Protestant Origins of American Political Thought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

John Harley Warner, "Orthodoxy and Otherness: Homeopathy and Regular Medicine in Nineteenth-Century America," in *Culture, Knowledge, and Healing: Historical Perspectives of Homeopathic Medicine in Europe and North America*, eds. Robert Jütte, Guether B. Risse, and John Woodward. Sheffield, U.K.: European Association for the History of Health and Medicine, 1998, pp. 5-29.